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RESTITUTION UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
IN OHIO
The Ohio statute of frauds provides that no action shall be brought
to charge the defendant upon certain specified types of contracts unless
the agreement upon which the action is brought or some note or memoran-
dum thereof shall be in writing.' Unfortunately, too few laymen realize
this and continue to make oral agreements within the statute, consulting
their attorney only after trouble arises. They then demand relief from
the harsh results the statute often produces.
Although the statute is quite explicit, there are means of avoiding
its severity. A check-list of available theories by which a remedy may be
obtained was presented and explained in a recent volume of this Journal.2
That article, however, was general in scope and did not attempt to analyze
specifically the law of Ohio. Often the plaintiff's most effective remedy
will be an action on the oral contract, to place him where he would have
been had the contract been performed. This is possible in Ohio where
there has been a sufficient part performance to "take the oral agreement
out of the statute." An analysis of Ohio cases on part performance suffi-
cient to avoid the statute of frauds was recently presented by a comment
in the University of Cincinnati Law Review.' The present work is in-
tended as a complement to these two articles, treating specifically the Ohio
law applicable to the situation where the parties entered into an oral
agreement which failed to comply with the statute, and restitution is sought
for the benefit conferred in performance of or in reliance upon the
unenforceable agreement.4
There are a number of reasons why the plaintiff might consider the
possibilities of an action to protect his restitution interest. Among the most
likely are: his part performance is insufficient or of a type which will not
take the oral contract out of the statute permitting an action on the con-
1 OHIO REV. CODE § 1335.05 (1953). Such types of contracts are: those to
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person; those of an execu-
tor or administrator to answer damages out of his own estate; agreements made
upon consideration of marriage; contracts or sales of interests in land; and agree-
ments not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.
2 Krauskopf, Solving Statute of Frauds Problems, 20 O.S.L.J. 237 (1959).
3 The Doctrine of Part Performance in Ohio, 23 U. CINc. L. REV. 200
(1954).
4 For a general and quite comprehensive treatment of restitution under the
statute of frauds, see the following three articles by Professor Jeanblanc: Jean-
blanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit,
26 IND. I. J. 1 (1950) ; Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What
Constitutes an Unjust Retention, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 923 (1950) ; Jeanblanc, Res-
titution Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly
Retained, 15 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1950). See also, 25 OHIO JuR. 2d, Frauds, Statute of
§§ 274-84 (1957).
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tract; the plaintiff himself may have defaulted on the contract, removing
the availability of an action on it; the contract may have been a bad bar-
gain rendering recovery on it worthless; or, even though plaintiff has
partly performed he could be adequately compensated by pecuniary dam-
ages, making specific performance unavailable. In any such case res-
titution should be examined.
THEORY OF RESTITUTION UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Restitution is generally available to restore a benefit defendant has
obtained from the plaintiff which it would be unjust for him to retain
without compensating the plaintiff.5 The action is not brought on the oral
contract in spite of the statute of frauds, but rather, wholly independently
of the contract. Evidence of the oral agreement is admissible solely to
prove the elements of an action for restitution, "benefit" to the defend-
ant and his "unjust retention."' Whenever the defendant has been un-
justly enriched, plaintiff is entitled to restitution, and the application of
this principle cannot be prevented by the existence of a statute of frauds.
In permitting restitutionary recovery for services performed under an
oral contract unenforceable because not performable within one year, the
Ohio Supreme Court said:
When one has received money, goods, or benefits from
another, justice and equity demand that he should pay there-
for, and the law will, if necessary, imply a promise to that
effect. And although such benefits may have been rendered
under a void contract, or one that can not be enforced, it can
not be allowed that a defendant can retain his advantage with-
out compensation. This would be unconscionable. . . .If this
contract can not be enforced by reason of the statute, the law
can imply a promise precisely like it. The defendant has re-
ceived the benefit of the services . . . and it would be a re-
proach to the law if he were permitted to retain these benefits
without just payment.'
The most commonly used remedy to effect restitution is an action
at law in "quasi-contract" or, as it is more familiarly known in Ohio,
quantum meruit. The measure of recovery in such an action is the
reasonable value of the benefit received by the defendant. Restitutionary
5 Rice v. Savings & Trust Co., 155 Ohio St. 391, 99 N.E.2d 301 (1951) ; Hum-
mel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938); Cleveland Co. v. Stand-
ard Amusement Co., 103 Ohio St. 382, 133 N.E. 615 (1921) ; Hossler v. Trump,
62 Ohio St. 139, 56 N.E. 656 (1900) ; Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 57
Ohio St. 182, 48 N.E. 888 (1897) ; Towsley v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 184 (1876);
Buck v. Waddle, 1 Ohio 357 (1824); Southard v. Curson, 13 Ohio App. 289
(1920); Gallagher v. Billmaier, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 154 N.E.2d 472 (Sixth
Dist. Cty. Ct. 1958) ; Miner v. Greve, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 93 (Ct. App. 1939);
Himes v. Rickman, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 574 (Ct. App. 1934); Ortman v. Ortman, 17
Ohio L. Abs. 525 (Ct. App. 1934); National Glass & Lens Co. v. Parsons, 28
Ohio Law Rep. 573 (Ct. App. 1928).
6 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
7 Towsley v. Moore, supra note 5.
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relief is also available under the equitable remedies of constructive trust,'
equitable lien, 9 and equitable accounting.
10
BENEFIT
In order to recover his restitution interest the first element which
plaintiff must prove is that his performance has resulted in a "benefit"
to defendant. What constitutes a legal benefit varies in different situations,
but like the term "value" in economics, it is probably founded upon satis-
faction of human wants. It is necessary only to show that defendant re-
ceived something that is valuable to him." The legal benefit to defendant,
however, must usually be reduced to monetary terms so that a restitution
judgment may be expressed as a pecuniary value. There is a clear objective
manifestation of benefit when defendant has received from plaintiff
money, 12 or items such as land or goods which he can exchange for
money.' Likewise, the benefit is fairly obvious where plaintiff has per-
formed services for which defendant would otherwise have had to pay
someone else.' 4 A benefit is conferred where one by performing an act
saves another the expense of performing a duty.' 5 Where one uses an-
other's property he is benefited to the extent of its reasonable rental
value.'" Admission of proof of any such benefit in spite of the statute
of frauds seems justified because none of these situations necessarily re-
quires proof of the unenforceable promise to establish the benefit.
When there is no manifest advantage to defendant or increase in
his wealth resulting from plaintiff's actions in reliance on the oral con-
tract, there is a tendency to use the oral agreement itself to prove benefit.
8Bender v. Cleveland Trust Co., 123 Ohio St. 588, 176 N.E. 452 (1931);
Dean v. Dean, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 216 (C.P. 1955); Ward v. Ward, 12 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 59 (1901).
9Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio St. 142, 105 N.E. 278
(1913); Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N.E. 214 (1912); Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Olt, 70 Ohio L Abs. 125 (U.S. Dist.Ct. N.D. Ohio 1954).
10 Dean v. Dean, supra note 8.
11 Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a
Legal Benefit, supra note 4.
12 Hummel v. Hummel, supra note 5; Buck v. Waddle, supra note 5.
13 Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., supre note 5. A good discussion
of benefit will be found in this case where restitution was sought by a plaintiff
who had performed before breach of contract by defendant, and the contract price
was less than market price, distinguishing Doolittle v. McCullough, 12 Ohio St.
360 (1861), where, because a less difficult portion of the contract had been per-
formed, it was held no benefit was conferred.
14 Hossler v. Trump, supra note 5; Towsley v. Moore, supra note 5. The
great majority of courts have held that services rendered in performance of an
unenforceable agreement constitute a legal benefit irrespective of the character
of the return performance promised by the defendant.
15 Sommers v. Board of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925) (parent
performed a duty of the Board of Education by transporting his children to
school).
16 Gallagher v. Billmaier, supra note 5.
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Defendant's request and promise of return performance demonstrates his
desire for that which plaintiff has given and shows he was willing to
pay for it. Furthermore, defendant's accepting, retaining, or consuming
plaintiff's performance, under the unenforceable agreement, is additional
evidence of satisfaction of his desires. 7 This is expressed as the "bar-
gained-for performance" concept of benefit.' 8
At least some support for bargained-for performance as benefit may
be found in Ohio. In Himes v. Rickman the court said, "the oral agree-
ment . . . tends to show that defendant intended to compensate them."' 9
An intention to compensate is clearly indicative that the performance was
thought by the defendant to be valuable or beneficial to him. It was like-
wise held proper, in Ortman v. Ortman2 0 to instruct the jury that evi-
dence of the oral agreement was admissible if limited to the issue as to
whether or not there was a promise to pay. It should be noted that in
both of these cases plaintiff's performance was in the form of non-
returnable services. The courts seem more likely in this sort of case to
emphasize the defendant's request and his promise of return performance
as a means of showing that he got what he wanted. Should plaintiff find
it necessary to employ this theory to prove the defendant's benefit, he will
find ample support from such authorities as Williston and the Restate-
ments of Contracts and Restitution. 2 1
A distinction which must be observed in the bargained-for perform-
ance cases is that such performance only constitutes benefit when done
at defendant's request. Thus in Welsh v. Welsh,2 2 although the possibility
of enforcing the oral contract in equity after a part performance was
mentioned as the reason for refusing quasi-contractual relief, the principal
argument was that improvements made by the purchaser were intended
for his own benefit and were not "requested" by the vendor.
UNJUST RETENTION
The fact that plaintiff's performance has conferred a legal benefit
on defendant does not alone justify a recovery in restitution. It must
further be shown that his retention of that benefit is unjust. That is,
17 See Jeanblanc's explanation, supra note 11, at 6.
18 Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 254.
19 17 Ohio L. Abs. 574, 577 (Cr. App. 1934).
20 Supra note 5.
21 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 536 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 347-48 (1932); RESTATEMENT RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). There appears to be
no Ohio Supreme Court authority on the bargained-for performance concept of
benefit, however, so plaintiff might anticipate a number of defensive arguments,
including an outright attack on the concept. More likely, though, is the contention
that the concept should not be applied in statute of frauds cases, appealing to the
court's duty to respect the statute at least where is it necessary to use the unen-
forceable contract as evidence of the benefit. Defendant would claim that clearly
in such case he is being "charged on the contract." See further in this connection,
Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 255.
22 5 Ohio 425 (1832).
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plaintiff must show that upon examination of all the circumstances of the
particular transaction and the conduct of both parties, the retention is in-
equitable or unjust.23 Difficulty may arise for plaintiff's attorney in any
of three facets of his case. Defendant may contend that plaintiff was
merely an officious intermeddler, a volunteer, or that at the time of per-
formance the benefit was intended to be gratuitous. Second, plaintiff may
be in default under the parol agreement. Third, defendant may be ready
and willing to perform the contract.
In any of these cases, recovery would likely be denied plaintiff on
the ground that it is not unjust under the circumstances for defendant
to retain the benefit without reimbursement. 24 Therefore it is desirable
to consider whether, in any of these situations, the statute of frauds pre-
vents use of the oral contract as evidence on any of these issues. In Ohio
the words of the statute, that defendant shall not be charged on the oral
contract, have been interpreted to make the contract only voidable,25 and
evidence of the oral contract is admissible in all the situations.
As to the first aspect of the plaintiff's possible difficulties, if de-
fendant can successfully assert that plaintiff officiously conferred the bene-
fit on him, recovery in restitution must be denied. Although there clearly
may be an enrichment, it is not unjustly retained.26 Proof, however, of the
oral agreement is admissible in order to show that defendant intended to
compensate the plaintiff and thus negative officiousness. 2" Of course,
evidence relative to the oral contract is limited to the issue as to whether
or not there was a promise to pay.2"
Similar to the problem of officiousness is that of gratuitous perform-
ance, an example of which is found in the family relationship doctrine.2 9
2 3 Jeanblanc has suggested that the determination should be based on a con-
sideration of such variable factors as: (1) the effect of the repudiation of the
oral agreement, (2) the willful or inadvertent character of the plaintiff's repudi-
ation, (3) the effect of the statute of frauds upon the oral agreement, (4) the
extent of performance rendered, (5) the failure to make restoration, and (6) the
willingness of the defendant to be bound by the terms of the oral agreement. Res-
titution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes an Unjust Retention,
supra note 4, at 924.
24 See notes 26, 29-31, 34 and 39, infra.
25 Minns v. Morse, 15 Ohio 568 (1846).
26 Prudential Co-op. Realty Co. v. Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E.
695 (1928); Cleveland v. Legal News Publishing Co., 110 Ohio St. 360, 144 N.E.
256 (1924) ; Vindicator Printing Co. v. State, 68 Ohio St. 362, 67 N.E. 733 (1903) ;
Columbus, H. V. & T. R.R. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104-, 61 N.E. 152 (1901);
Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898); Cincinnati v. Gas Light
and Coke Co., 53 Ohio St. 278, 41 N.E. 239 (1895) ; Clark v. Lindsey, 47 Ohio
St. 437, 25 N.E. 422 (1890); Brumbaugh v. Chapman, 45 Ohio St. 368, 13 N.E. 584
(1887); Villiamson v. Cole, 26 Ohio St. 207 (1875); Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio
St. 268 (1853). See also, REsTATE MENT, RESTIruroN §§ 2, 112 (1937).
27 Himes v. Rickman, supra note 5.
28 Ortman v. Ortman, supra note 5.
29 25 OHIO JuR. 2t, Frauds, Statute of § 280 (1957).
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Plaintiff may not recover compensation for services performed for an-
other member of his family unless he can establish that there was an
express contract on his part to perform them for compensation and on the
part of the other to accept such services and pay for them.3" In such a
situation no obligation to pay will be implied under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment, but rather, "services rendered between members of the same
family shall be presumed to be gratuitously rendered even though such
services may be performed at the express request of the person receiving
the benefit."'" This doctrine, however, is inapplicable where there are
significant other circumstances to counteract the presumption of gratuity. 32
Consequently, in a quasi-contractual action to recover for services rendered
to a family member under an unenforceable oral contract, where the
defense of the statute of frauds is raised, the plaintiff may be able to in-
troduce the oral contract to show an express agreement' rebutting the
presumption that the services were gratuitous.3 3.
Where the plaintiff himself has repudiated the oral agreement, a
second problem arises. This conduct is generally considered sufficiently
inequitable that the defendant's acceptance, consumption, or retention of
the benefit is not regarded as unjust. Several Ohio cases have therefore
denied quasi-contractual recovery to a party who was in substantial default
on his contractual promise.34 In Abbott v. Inskip, perhaps the leading
Ohio case which sets forth this position, the plaintiff Was denied recovery
in quantum meruit for the performance actually rendered when he aban-
doned the service in violation of his oral contract for services not per-
formable within one year. The court explained:
30 Lemunyon v. Newcomb, 120 Ohio St. 55, 165 N.E. 533 (1929); Merrick v.
Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 110 N.E. 493 (1915); Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256,
65 N.E. 999 (1902); Bemis v. Bemis, 83 Ohio App. 95, 82 N.E.2d 757 (1948)
Sokolowski v. Lucey, 47 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio App. 1941).
31 Merrick v. Ditzler, supra note 30, at 263.
3 2 1n re Estate of Bowman, 102 Ohio App. 121, 141 N.E.2d 499 (1956) (ab-
sence of the reciprocal and mutual benefits which ordinarily exist within a family
relationship) ; Bemis v. Bemis, supra note 30 (express agreement for such serv-
ices between parties who did not live in same house). Another situation where
the doctrine does not apply is where the person for whom the services were per-
formed is not sui juris. Scattergood v. Ingram, 86 Ohio St. 76, 98 N.E. 923 (1912)
Markland v. Harley, 107 Ohio App. 245, 158 N.E.2d 209 (1958).
33 Sokolowski v. Lucey, supra note 30; Miner v. Greve, supra note 5 (holding
that an abortive will, made to carry out an unenforceable oral contract to devise
real estate to a brother in consideration of care and support rendered by him to
the decedent, was properly admitted in evidence for the limited purpose of show-
ing that such services were not gratuitous, in an action to recover the reasonable
value of such services).
34 Ashley v. Henahan, 56 Ohio St. 559, 47 N.E. 573 (1897) ; Abbott v. Inskip,
29 Ohio St. 59 (1875); Massaro v. Bashara, 91 Ohio App. 475, 108 N.E.2d 850
(1952); Galagher v. Dettelbach, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 598 (1902). See also Tier
v. Singrey, 154 Ohio St. 521, 97 N.E.2d 20 (1951) (dictum to the effect that
vendee may retain rents remitted by vendor under unenforceable contract sub-
sequently repudiated by vendor).
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The plaintiff . . relied on an implied promise, on the
part of the defendant, that he would pay the plaintiff the
reasonable value of his services. The express promise con-
tained in the agreement, under which the plaintiff assumed to
render the service, excludes the presumption of the implied
promise relied on.35
It is submitted that the approach of Zbbott is inconsistent with the
traditional concept that a breach of contract does not constitute a tort, or
give rise to a claim for punitive damages.36 Any plaintiff should be en-
titled to recover for a benefit which he has conferred on the defendant
and for which he has not been paid. To deny recovery on an implied
promise because of the plaintiff's breach of his express promise smacks
clearly of punishment for breach of contract. The plaintiff in Kirkland v.
,4rchbold,3" for example, defaulted after accomplishing about half of the
agreed performance. In a well reasoned opinion of the Ohio Court of
Appeals, recovery was permitted according to a determination of the(Cvalue of the work and materials expended on a quantum meruit basis"
less damages caused by the plaintiff's breach.3 8 This indicates a refreshing
reorientation in Ohio legal concepts; instead of looking only to fault on
the part of the plaintiff, the court also considered the unjust enrichment
of the defendant.
Plaintiff's third area of difficulty is presented by a situation where
defendant elects not to rely on the statute of frauds, but is willing,
ready, and able to perform the oral contract. Defendant thereby chooses
to reimburse the plaintiff precisely according to their bargain. This can
hardly be unjust.
The default of a defendant, or his refusal to go on with a
contract which falls within the statute of frauds, is an essen-
tial condition of the right to recover for services rendered under
it. It is only in cases where the defendant, by reason of his own
breach of such contract, is estopped from setting it up as a de-
fense that an action for the value of the work done under it
can be maintained. 9
The presence or absence of unjustness on the defendant's part may be
proved by way of the oral contract because the only way to know
whether or not defendant is willing or able to go on with the agreement,
even though it is unenforceable, is to admit evidence of its terms.4
35 Supra note 34, at 61.
36 McCoipumIC, DAMAGES 637-39 (1935).
37113 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio App. 1953).
38id. at 499. See a thorough analysis of this case in Nordstrom and Wood-
land, Recovery by Building Contractor in Default, 20 OHIo ST. L. J. 193, 202-05
(1959).
3 9 Abbott v. Inskip, supra note 34, at'61.
40Hummel v. Hummel, supra note 5; Massaro v. Bashara, supra note 34;
Potts v. Potts, 72 Ohio App. 268, 51 N.E.2d 226 (1942); Prechtel v. Prechtel, 16
Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 528 (1905); Galagher v. Dettelbach, supra note 34.
1959]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VALUE OF BENEFIT
When the defendant has been unjustly enriched and plaintiff seeks
monetary restitution, rather than restitution in specie, the measure of re-
covery is usually stated as the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.4
"The fundamental duty of the defendant is restitution, and . . . the law
gives money value generally, not because that is the plaintiff's primary
right but merely as the equivalent of what he is entitled to."42 Where the
defendant has received money under an unenforceable contract and he
refuses to perform, asserting the statute of frauds, plaintiff may recover
the money back, there being no problem as to the evaluation of legal
benefit.43 In many cases, however, the benefit is other than money, and
the value of that which defendant has promised is certainly probative of
the value of the benefit to him. Hence the question arises whether the
oral contract may be used to measure the monetary value.
When the defendant has promised to pay money for the plaintiff's
performance, a few Ohio cases have admitted evidence of the oral
promise despite the defense of the statute of frauds.44 Such decisions,
though, are contrary to the leading Ohio case of Towsley v. Moore,4" the
rule of which they have apparently misconstrued, and on which they base
their authority. The plaintiff in Towsley, a minor about eleven years old,
orally agreed to work for defendant in his home until she arrived at the
age of eighteen; for which defendant promised to board, clothe, and
furnish her with schooling, and at the expiration of her period of service,
pay her what such servWces were reasonably worth. The plaintiff remained
with him during the time specified and performed her part of the bar-
gain, and then was forced to sue for her pay. Although the court per-
mitted recovery equalling the contract price stipulated in the oral agree-
ment, this similarity does not indicate that the contract furnished the
measure of recovery. The reason for the similarity is simply that "the ex-
press contract was just what the law would imply, namely, reasonable re-
ward for services performed."4 The court clearly pointed out that the
express oral contract can not be of any avail to either party. 17 However,
it seems that there is adequate justification for the minority Ohio view.
41 E.g., Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 135 N.E.2d 866 (1956) (serv-
ices); Cleveland Co. v. Standard Amusement Co., supra note 5 (services); Kling
v. Bordner, 65 Ohio St. 86, 61 N.E. 148 (1901) (services) ; Wellston Coal Co. v.
Franklin Paper Co., supra note 5 (goods) ; Reinheimer v. Carter, 31 Ohio St. 579
(1877) (services) ; Towsley v. Moore, supra note 5 (services) ; Moore v. Beasley,
3 Ohio 294 (1827) (rent for use of land) ; Gallagher v. Billmaier, supra note 5
(rent for use of land).
422 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 535 (rev. ed. 1936).
43 Galagher v. Dettelbach, supra note 34; Buck v. Waddle, supra note 5.44 Kurz v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 7 Ohio N.P. 118 (1900);
Cowie v. Central Trust Co., 28 Ohio L. Abs. 536 (C.P. 1939) (dictum).45 Supra note 5.
46 Towsley v. Moore, supra note 5, at 195.4 7 Ibid.
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Evidence of the oral promise should be admitted, not as the conclusive
measure of recovery, but as an admission regarding the amount of benefit
the defendant derived from the plaintiff's performance. Professor Wood-
ward argues:
Reasonably interpreted, the statute applies only to the
enforcement of oral contracts. It does not relate to oral admis-
sions against interest. If, then, the same transaction happens
to amount to both an oral contract and an oral admission, the
unenforceability or invalidity of the contract should not affect
the competency of the admission as evidence of a non-con-
tractual obligation. 48 .
When the consideration orally agreed upon for plaintiff's perform-
ance is property or a promise to will property, the cases exclude evidence
of the value of the promised property as determinative of the value of
the defendant's benefit.49 This situation is clearly distinguishable from
that in which the defendant has promised to pay money, for here the
property would have to be converted to a monetary value before it could
be used to measure the value of the plaintiff's performance. Yurthermore,
it is the benefit to defendant, not loss to the plaintiff, which is being
evaluated."0 There is no justification for resorting to the secondary evi-
dence of the consideration anticipated by the plaintiff when reduction of
the plaintiff's performance itself to pecuniary terms would be more
orderly and give just as precise a measure. In addition, most of the cases
where the alleged oral promise was to transfer property are those in
which plaintiff has performed services for a decedent. Quite often the
value of the property is obviously greater than the reasonable value of
the services rendered and to use the value of the property as the measure
would in reality tend toward protection of plaintiff's expectation, rather
than his restitution, interest.5" This would manifestly be contrary to
the entire concept of the statute of frauds.
48 WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 166 (1913). See also Jeanblanc, Restitution
Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly Re-
tained, supra note 4, at 5-6.
49 Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588, 144 N.E. 715 (1924); Snider v.
Rollins, 102 Ohio St. 372, 131 N.E. 733 (1921); Kling v. Bordner, supra note 41;
Howard v. Brower, 37 Ohio St. 402 (1881) ; Struble v. Struble, 42 Ohio App. 353,
182 N.E. 48 (1932); Southard v. Curson, supra note 5; Walters v. Heidy, 1 Ohio
App. 66 (1913); Himes v. Rickman, supra note 5 (evidence of oral contract ad-
mitted, however, but limited to issue of whether or not there was a contract to
pay); Ortman v. Ortman, supra note 5 (same as Himes); Martin v. Dickey, 9
Ohio L. Abs. 500 (Ct. App. 1930); Norris v. Clark, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 564
(Dist. Ct. 1878).
50 This is implicit in Towsley, supra note 5. Plaintiff was permitted to re-
cover on a quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services rendered but
not for damages for breach of contract. To like effect, see Hummel v. Hummel,
supra note 5.
51 The various contract interests protected by the courts are very well pre-
sented in Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
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Although plaintiff may be precluded from charging the defendant
on the oral agreement, the defendant himself may wish to introduce the
contract (1) to limit the plaintiff's recovery in restitution to the con-
tract price, or (2) to show he has conferred some benefit on plaintiff
offsetting that which plaintiff can recover from him. On principle it
seems that the oral promise should be available to limit recovery to the
contract price where recovery is permitted to a defaulting plaintiff.5" This
is so because, of course, no one should profit from his own wrong. Where
the defendant is the defaulting party this limitation probably is inap-
plicable and restitution of the reasonable value of the plaintiff's perform-
ance is recoverable regardless of the oral contract.5 3 An example is Himes
v. Rickman, an action in quantum meruit for services rendered a de-
fendant under an oral contract to devise or transfer real estate in return.
The defendant argued that the value of the real estate was only $4,000
and that he was alive with years of life expectancy remaining when plain-
tiffs left his property. Hence it was obvious that plaintiff's claim of $4,000
was unreasonable inasmuch as that was all that could have been expected
had the parties gone through with their oral contract. The court rejected
this argument, stating its weakness was that "the action was not for
specific performance of the contract but on quantum meruit." 54 Although
no Ohio cases in point were found, the defendant probably may use the
oral contract to offset plaintiff's claim by showing he also benefited the
plaintiff. 5 This is so because enrichment is only unjust if obtained with-
out compensation.
Sometimes even plaintiff's expectation interest is protected by an
L.J. 52, 373 (1936). These interests may be briefly summarized: (1) The resti-
tutionary interest, that created when the plaintiff in reliance on the contract con-
fers something of value on the defendant. (2) The reliance interest, that created
by plaintiff's change of position in reliance on the contract, other than by con-
ferring value on the defendant. Although there is a loss to the plaintiff, the
expenditure has benefited not the defendant but a third person. (3) The expecta-
tion interest, that usually protected in an action "on the contract." To protect this
interest is to place the plaintiff in the position in which he would have been had
the contract been performed.
52-However, no Ohio cases were found on this precise point. See Krauskopf,
supra note 2, at 261-62.
53 REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 comment (g) (1932); Jeanblanc, Restitu-
tion Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal Benefit Unjustly
Retained, supra note 4.
Himes v. Rickman, supra note 5, at 576. It is questionable whether in Ohio
even a 'written contract is available to limit plaintiff's recovery in restitution when
defendant is in default. In Allen, Heaton & McDonald, Inc. v. Castle Farm
Amusement Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949), the court stated without
qualification that "plaintiff may elect to rescind the contract and sue for the value
of the performance rendered." For amplification of this point and an analysis of
the Ohio cases, see Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution
for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 264, 272 n. 34 (1959).
5 5 Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 262.
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action for restitution, and the effect is as though the action were brought
"on the contract." This is true where the amount of money defendant
promised is used to measure the value of his benefit. An example of such
a situation is Hummel v. Hummel,56 in which plaintiff orally agreed with
defendant (his son) to pay the premiums on an endowment policy in de-
fendant's life in return for defendant's promise to pay him the proceeds
of the policy. This contract was unenforceable because it was not per-
formable within one year. When, upon maturity, the defendant refused to
turn over the money, restitutionary recovery was permitted of the entire
proceeds of the policy, precisely what had been agreed upon. Perhaps
believing that this result too nearly approximated enforcement of the con-
tract itself in the face of the statute of frauds, some Ohio cases have dis-
allowed recovery beyond the amount of the premiums paid plus interest,
the cost to the plaintiff."7 This, however, represents protection of the re-
liance interest only. The measure in Hummel appears proper for, al-
though the effect is identical to enforcement of the unenforceable con-
tract, the true measure of recovery in restitution has been employed,
namely, the monetary value of the benefit unjustly retained by the de-
fendant.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Having established a benefit to defendant and its unjust retention,
the plaintiff may discover a further impediment in that the defendant
does not have sufficient ready cash to pay a money judgment or that the
money which represents the benefit has been commingled with other
funds. Plaintiff need not be left without an effective remedy inasmuch as
constructive trusts, equitable liens and equitable accounting are all avail-
able to alleviate his problems.
To impose a constructive trust does no violence to the statute of
frauds." Equity is in no sense attempting to compel performance of an
oral trust, but is simply applying its remedial process to prevent unjust
enrichment. Courts will not tolerate one party's being made richer
through another's loss, 9 and it makes no difference that this enrichment
arose through an oral transaction. "The constructive trust springs from
the transaction not the contract."6 It should be remembered that the
constructive trust is not a trust at all but a remedial device, and there is
56 Supra note 5.
07 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Olt, supra note 9; Septer v. Septer, 19 Ohio L. Abs.
397 (P. Ct. 1935).
08 RETATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 202 comment h (1937).
59,"For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through an-
other's loss." Digest of Justinian, lib. 12, tit. 6, s. 14, as quoted in DAWSON, UN-
JUST ENRICHMENT 3 (1951).
00 Vanneman, The Constructive Trust: A Neglected Remedy in Ohio, 10 U.
CiNc. L. REV. 366, 401 (1936).
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ample authority for its use as such in Ohio.61 An illustration of its use in
the statute of frauds field is presented by Topper Bros. v. Bohn,62 in
which the defendant orally promised to purchase certain property for the
plaintiff for an agreed compensation, but after making the purchase re-
fused to recognize the interest of his principal under the contract, keeping
the property for himself instead. The court held that the agent under the
oral contract held the property upon a constructive trust for the plaintiff,
his undisclosed principal.
The remedy of equitable lien is likewise available in Ohio to trace
funds which the defendant has unjustly obtained from the plaintiff." An
example is the Olt case, 4 in which a mother who had paid the premiums
on an endowment policy on her daughter's life was entitled to a lien on
the proceeds of the policy for the amount of the premiums paid plus
interest.
Equitable accounting may be employed where there has been an
unjust enrichment but the funds were received by the defendant under
such a complex arrangement that the plaintiff cannot assert the precise
amount of the benefit. Thus in Dean v. Dean,65 the parties orally agreed
to purchase a duplex apartment house in defendant's name, but that an
undivided half interest therein would belong to the plaintiff, and that
when a specified event occurred defendant would convey the half interest
to the plaintiff. The house was purchased according to the agreement, each
party moved into his half of the building, and the parties shared equally
the mortgage payments, repairs, water bills and all other expenditures of
ownership. Upon the happening of the event, defendant refused to con-
vey. Instead, the defendant sold the realty and made various purchases
with the proceeds. These facts were held to warrant an equitable ac-
counting and a declaration of trust in partition of the other realty which
the defendant had purchased with the proceeds of sale of the original
property. The court said this was "not an action for damages for breach
of an alleged oral agreement," but rather, it was "clearly an action
seeking restitution.' 6
6
61 Bender v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 8; Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St.
144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927) ; Barnes v. Christy, 102 Ohio St. 160, 131 N.E. 352
(1921) ; Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N.E. 1098 (1910) ; Newton v.
Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399 (1877); Mathews v. Leamon, 24 Ohio St. 615 (1874);
Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204 (1859); Dean v. Dean, supra note 8; Fergu-
son v. Deuble, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (Ct. App. 1938); Hays v. Warner, 22 Ohio
L. Abs. 56 (Ct. App. 1936) ; Pearl-Market Bank & Trust Co. v. Woodward Co.,
22 Ohio L. Abs. 328 (Ct. App. 1935); Taft v. Guardian Trust Co., 17 Ohio L.
Abs. 54 (Cleveland Munic. Ct. 1934); Ward v. Ward, supra note 8.
6212 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 177 (1911).
63 See cases cited supra in notes 9 and 57.
64 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Olt, supra note 9.
65 Supra note 8.
6 6 Id. at 220.
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CONCLUSION
When faced with the statute of frauds, the Ohio attorney should
not fail to examine the desirability of a restitution action. Whenever the
doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable he can obtain recovery of at
least as much as the benefit to the defendant. Probably he will recover
for all the loss plaintiff has sustained, and if the court should employ
defendant's promise as the measure of recovery he will obtain precisely
what he could have received in a contract action. Despite its severe
language, the statute of frauds is no bar to recovery when plaintiff has
done something for which he was not compensated.
Robert E Lewis
